When history accelerates, the space between stability and collapse can
vanish in months. Bangladesh today is a striking example. Once a regional
partner committed to moderation, economic growth, and constructive ties with
India, the country has veered dramatically off course. In recent months, the
political order has been upended: Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, long viewed as
a bulwark against extremism and a friend of India, now lives in exile in New
Delhi. In her place, the reins of governance are with Nobel laureate Muhammad
Yunus — an unlikely chief executive in a state increasingly dominated by
radical Islamist forces.
Behind Mr Yunus’ technocratic image lies a deeper and more dangerous
realignment of power. The ideological centre of gravity has shifted sharply.
The Jamaat-e-Islami, once a fringe player tightly monitored by Sheikh Hasina’s
government, now operates with impunity, setting the tone for governance and
social control. Bangladesh’s already fragile secular consensus has collapsed.
Reports of purges in the bureaucracy, censorship in academia, and a surge in
Islamist vigilantism paint a sobering picture of a state captured by radical
ideologues.
The political space is volatile. Mr Yunus finds himself under siege from
multiple fronts. The Bangladesh Army is restive and reportedly suspicious of
his authority. University campuses –long a site of political mobilisation —
are simmering with student protests, with many still loyal to the banned but
still influential Awami League. Tension between these three power centres —
the radicals, the Army and the civilian street — has reached a point where
even minor provocations could spark major unrest.
I have often written that Pakistan never left Bangladesh, not even after
1971. Amidst this upheaval, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) came
looking for its moorings. The ISI has turned eastward to revive its old
networks and stoke new fires. ISI operatives have made multiple covert visits
to Dhaka in recent weeks, after initial visits by the hierarchy. Their
objectives are clear: deepen Bangladesh’s Islamist tilt, revive insurgent
linkages into India’s Northeast, and create an eastern theatre of instability
that could distract and divide the Indian security forces.
This should not come as a surprise. The ISI has a long history of
involvement in Bangladesh. During the 2000s, it cultivated elements of the BNP
and Jamaat to allow safe havens for insurgents from Nagaland, Manipur and Assam.
Arms flow through Cox’s Bazar, training camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and
ideological indoctrination in madrasas was part of a broader asymmetric
playbook. What was once disrupted during the Hasina years is now being quietly
resurrected under cover of the current chaos.
The recent Operation Sindoor, however, has demonstrated India’s
political will and kinetic precision in targeting cross-border terror
infrastructure. It should have sent ripples across the region. The doctrine of
pre-emptive and retaliatory action cannot be ignored. The message of Sindoor —
that India will hold not just the perpetrators but also the enablers of terror
accountable — should have had a salutary effect on anti-India quarters in
Dhaka.
China, too, has been watching closely and recalibrating its posture.
Though traditionally focused on infrastructure and trade, Beijing now sees
strategic opportunity in Dhaka’s disarray. Intelligence inputs suggest growing
interest in dual-use facilities across northern Bangladesh, particularly at
Lalmonirhat airfield, originally built during the Second World War but recently
rehabilitated under a civilian pretext. Located less than 50 km from the
“Siliguri Corridor”, any Chinese involvement there would carry serious
strategic implications for India’s connectivity to the Northeast. While no
formal military presence has been confirmed, the pattern echoes other
precedents in the Indo-Pacific — civilian infrastructure paving the way for
security footprints. India must treat any such developments as potential “red
lines”.
While overt diplomatic leverage in Dhaka is weaker today than during
Hasina’s premiership, quiet channels — especially military-to-military links
— can still be nurtured. For all its internal tensions, the Bangladesh military
remains a nationalist institution with some institutional memory of its
cooperation with India. Officers trained in Indian military institutions and
having served with Indian military personnel in the United Nations, as also
commanders who understand the cost of instability, are India’s best
interlocutors now. Strategic engagement with these circles can help limit the
damage from the state’s ideological shift. Army to Army; uniform to uniform,
the language is the same.
Equally important is countering the psychological and narrative warfare
currently being deployed by Islamist forces and their foreign patrons. The fall
of Hasina is being framed not just as a political event but as an “Islamic
revival” that delegitimises secularism and demonises India. If unchallenged,
such narratives could radicalise an entire generation. India will need to
reassert the value of India-Bangladesh historical ties, including the 1971
Liberation War, which remains a powerful emotional anchor among many citizens.
The media has to be taken on board too.
In this, one under-utilised resource stands out: the Mukti Bahini
veterans, or “muktijoddha”. These are
respected voices, who fought shoulder to shoulder with the Indian Army to
liberate Bangladesh and still command moral authority in parts of society. Many
of them view the rise of Jamaat and the exile of Sheikh Hasina as a betrayal of
the very ideals they bled for. India should quietly mobilise this community —
through scholarships, medical support and cultural outreach — as an indigenous
counterforce to radicalisation. Their memory of Indian solidarity in 1971 is
far more persuasive than any other sentiment.
At the same time, India must pre-emptively address the threat of revived
insurgency. While peace agreements and successful surrenders have brought
relative calm to the Northeast, these gains are reversible. Any resurgence of
sanctuary, ideology or arms flow from Bangladesh could reignite long-dormant
conflicts. Central intelligence-sharing mechanisms would need to be recalibrated
with the fresh eastern threat in mind.
Finally, a word of caution. India must resist the temptation to
over-militarise its Bangladesh strategy. Hard power has its place, but so does
strategic patience and multi-vector engagement. Regional diplomatic outreach to
Asean, especially Myanmar and Thailand, could help coordinate responses to
Rohingya radicalisation and arms smuggling. Quiet engagement with international
financial institutions could pressure the Yunus regime to restrain the Jamaat’s
worst instincts. India’s own civil society — its universities, think tanks and
cultural bodies — should be encouraged to engage with Dhaka’s isolated liberal
spaces to keep lines of empathy and understanding open.
The fall of Sheikh Hasina, the rise of radical Islamists, and the
re-entry of Pakistan into Bangladesh’s internal affairs is not just a Dhaka
story — it is a regional turning point. India must treat it as such. India,
however, can still shape events through engagement and creative diplomacy.
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